May 23, 2013
Washington, DC
Sean Hagan, General Counsel and Director, Legal Department;
QUESTIONER: Thank you for doing this. Two questions. The first, please, I would like to ask about Argentina, the case of Argentina. First of all, I saw your comment and the first question is: The holdouts have been litigating for more than 11 years. So, it seems to be that the only that they could not affect the restructuring process is to lose. If they win, they will affect the restructuring process.
So, the first question is that one. The only way the holdouts can avoid any complication in the restructuring process of the debt is to lose because if they win, I think they are disturbing the thing.
And the second one is if you can comment if you have any kind of consultation with the court if you are planning to do so, if you are going to send this document to them. If there is any kind of consultation with the court about this issue because I understand it’s the first time that you make a point of the thing. Thank you.
MR. HAGAN: Let me answer your second question first. There has been no consultation between the IMF and either the district court in New York or the U.S. Court of Appeals in Second Circuit.
With respect to your second question, what the paper does is the paper does not call into question the merits of this case in terms of whether or not the interpretation of the contract was correct or the interpretation of the statute is correct. What it does is, if one assumes that this decision stands, it looks at the implications of this decision on the restructuring process more generally.
Not specifically in the case of Argentina, but more generally, what are the implications of this case for sovereign debt restructuring and it makes an assessment that it will indeed enhance the leverage of holdout creditors. But the assessment here is intended to look at the system more generally and is not intended to basically delve into the details of the Argentine case. Thank you.
Washington, DC
Sean Hagan, General Counsel and Director, Legal Department;
QUESTIONER: Thank you for doing this. Two questions. The first, please, I would like to ask about Argentina, the case of Argentina. First of all, I saw your comment and the first question is: The holdouts have been litigating for more than 11 years. So, it seems to be that the only that they could not affect the restructuring process is to lose. If they win, they will affect the restructuring process.
So, the first question is that one. The only way the holdouts can avoid any complication in the restructuring process of the debt is to lose because if they win, I think they are disturbing the thing.
And the second one is if you can comment if you have any kind of consultation with the court if you are planning to do so, if you are going to send this document to them. If there is any kind of consultation with the court about this issue because I understand it’s the first time that you make a point of the thing. Thank you.
MR. HAGAN: Let me answer your second question first. There has been no consultation between the IMF and either the district court in New York or the U.S. Court of Appeals in Second Circuit.
With respect to your second question, what the paper does is the paper does not call into question the merits of this case in terms of whether or not the interpretation of the contract was correct or the interpretation of the statute is correct. What it does is, if one assumes that this decision stands, it looks at the implications of this decision on the restructuring process more generally.
Not specifically in the case of Argentina, but more generally, what are the implications of this case for sovereign debt restructuring and it makes an assessment that it will indeed enhance the leverage of holdout creditors. But the assessment here is intended to look at the system more generally and is not intended to basically delve into the details of the Argentine case. Thank you.
1 comentario:
Los holdouts deberían ganar, que el país que se llamaba antiguamente República Argentina quiebre, y que desaparezcan los mercados de préstamos para países. El país que no logre sostenerse con recursos genuinos deberá reformar su administración o morir.
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