(...) To the extent to which there is a center of gravity to the problem, it is in identifying potential terrorists. In both the Fort Hood attack and the Detroit incident, information was in the system that could have allowed authorities to identify and stop the attackers, but in both cases, this information didn’t flow to the places where action could have been taken. There is thus a chasm between the acquisition of information and the person who has the authority to do something about it. The system “knew” about both attackers, but systems don’t actually think or know anything. The person with authority to stop a Nigerian from boarding the plane or who could relieve the Fort Hood killer from duty lacked one or more of the following: intelligence, real authority and motivation.
The information gathered in Nigeria had to be widely distributed to be useful. It was unknown where Abdulmutallab was going to go or what he was going to do. The number of people who needed to know about him was enormous, from British security to Amsterdam ticket agents checking passports. Without distributing the intelligence widely, it became useless. A net can’t have holes that are too big, and the failure to distribute intelligence to all points creates holes.
(...)
Forgetting the interagency rivalries and the tendency to give contracts to corporate behemoths with last-generation technology, no matter how widely and efficiently intelligence is distributed, at each step in the process someone must be given real authority to make decisions. When Janet Napolitano or George Tenet say that the system worked after an incident, they mean not that the outcome was satisfactory, but that the process operated as the process was intended to operate. Of course, being faithful to a process is not the same as being successful, but the U.S. intelligence community’s obsession with process frequently elevates process above success. Certainly, process is needed to operate a vast system, but process also is being used to deny people authority to do what is necessary outside the process, or, just as bad, it allows people to evade responsibility by adhering to the process. (...)
STRATFOR
5 de enero de 2010
Información: procesamiento vs. proceso
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2 comentarios:
ISO 9001
excelente razonamiento, y el punto de escudarse en el procedimiento para evadir responsabilidades tambien
tendra que ver esta actitud de las agencias con la sensacion de vulnerabilidad que pueden tener ante el enfoque "legalista" del Ejecutivo con Obama? Digo, obvio que un cambio asi, de empezar a escarbar en los procedimientos utilizados por la agencia en el pasado erosiona la moral, pero opera de manera tan inmediata? dicho de otra manera, un incidente como el del nigeriano no habria pasado con la CIA en el gobierno de Bush?
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